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GENERAL COMPULSORY PATENT LICENSING
IN THE UNITED STATES: GOOD IN
THEORY, BUT NOT NECESSARY IN
PRACTICE
Mark W. Lauroescht
The tension between the patent laws and the need for free com-
petition has always surrounded the United States patent system. In
particular, this tension has been quite evident in the area of compul-
sory patent licensing. Although some forms of compulsory licens-
ing exist in the United States, such involuntary licensing has been
limited to specific circumstances and particular patented subject
matter. Unlike a number of foreign countries, no "general" com-
pulsory licensing statute, applicable to all patents that have not been
practiced or have been used for anticompetitive purposes, exists in
this country. Proponents of such licensing argue there is a need for
laws to ensure that the public receives the benefit of innovation and
that the exclusive rights granted under the patent laws are not
abused.1 Opponents, on the other hand, assert that mandatory li-
censing destroys the research incentive that is a fundamental objec-
tive of the U.S. patent system.2
This article scrutinizes this debate by first evaluating whether
there are any potentially positive effects to be achieved from general
compulsory licensing. The article then assesses whether general
compulsory licensing is compatible with the fundamental purposes
of the American patent laws. In this effort, the constitutionality of
compulsory licensing is considered along with whether compulsory
licensing is consistent with congressional intent in establishing the
patent laws. Based on this analysis, the article next evaluates the
likelihood of attaining substantial positive outcomes from general
compulsory licensing. It is concluded that although well-drafted
legislation authorizing compulsory licensing based on non-use or
Copyright © 1989 by M.W. Lauroesch. All Rights Reserved. This article was prepared dur-
ing the spring and summer of 1989.
t B.S. 1982, St. Lawrence University; M.S.M.E. 1984, University of Massachusetts;
J.D. 1989, George Washington University National Law Center.
1. See, e.g., Goldsmith, The Case for "Restricted" Compulsory Licensing, 2 APLA QJ.
146 (1974).
2. See, eg., Pravel, Say "No" to More Compulsory Licensing Statutes, 2 APLA Q.J.
185 (1974).
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abuse of patents would be constitutional and consistent with the
fundamental purposes of the patent laws, such legislation would not
serve those purposes to any appreciable extent.
I. THE POTENTIAL POSITIVE ASPECTS OF A GENERAL
COMPULSORY LICENSING LAW
Although some people support compulsory licensing purely
out of a distaste for the patent system, there appears to be a number
of positive effects that could potentially result from compulsory li-
censing. First, general compulsory licensing could help put unused
or unmarketed patented products in the consumers' hands when
patentees have not made efforts to practice their inventions. Several
foreign countries have adopted compulsory licensing laws based on
this rationale.3 Many of these countries have employed a "working
requirement" under which mandatory licenses are granted if a pat-
ent is not worked during the three years after the patent's issuance.
The Paris Convention permits its members to adopt this type of
provision.4 Moreover, the concept of a "working requirement" is
not unknown to U.S. intellectual property law. Section 337 of the
Trade Act generally provides a mechanism by which articles that
violate U.S. intellectual property laws can be excluded from entry
into the U.S.' However, the most recent amendments to the U.S.
trade laws added provisions limiting relief for patent, copyright,
trademark, and mask work violations to articles that exist or are "in
the process of being established."6 Although this law does not man-
date compulsory licensing, it effectively does so to an extent because
3. See, e.g., British Patents Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, ch. 87, § 37; R.S.C., ch. P-4,
§ 67 (1970) (Canada); PRC Patent Laws, arts. 51-58 (1984) (China), reprinted in 6 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 127, 136-37; J.O. 13, art. 32-33, Ind. Prop. 67 (1968) (France).
4. International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 13 U.S.T. 1,
T.I.A.S. No. 4931, art. 5(a)(4) (1967).
5. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988).
6. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (a)(2). Section 1337 gives further guidance on how the Inter-
national Trade Commission is to make this determination:
[A]n industry in the United States shall be considered to exist if there is in the
United States, with repect to the articles protected by the patent, copyright,
trademark, or mask work concerned-
(A) significant investment in plant and equipment;
(B) significant employment of labor or capital; or
(C) substantial investment in its exploitation, including engineering, re-
search and development, or licensing.
Id. § 1337 (a)(3) (emphasis added). The working requirement instituted by this law is not as
restrictive as such requirements found under foreign compulsory licensing provisions. Unlike
the foreign provisions, actual production of the article is not required and substantial invest-
ment is sufficient. See H.R. REP. No. 40, 100th Cong., Ist Sess., pt, 1, at 157-58 (1978); S.
REP. No. 71, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 129-30 (1987).
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the intellectual property owner's remedy through the U.S. Interna-
tional Trade Commission is unavailable unless he works-including
licenses-his invention. The main purpose of this provision is to
provide greater assurance that a complainant has a substantial in-
vestment to protect and is not just asserting frivolous charges
against a competitor-importer. Nonetheless, this provision may
also encourage inventors to practice their invention so that products
protected by intellectual property are available to the public. How-
ever, section 337 only institutes a working requirement for paten-
tees who want to enforce their rights against infringing importers,
but no such requirement exists for patentees enforcing their rights
against a domestic infringer. A general working requirement in the
U.S. applicable to patentees suing any infringer, 'might further en-
courage patentees to practice their inventions.
A second potential benefit of compulsory licensing is it might
combat patent suppression. Some patent holders use their patents
just to block competitors.7 For example, they may obtain an im-
provement patent to prevent competitors from entering their mar-
ket without any -intention of practicing or licensing the
improvement patent. As a consequence, consumers may not receive
the benefit of an improvement patent for seventeen years simply be-
cause a patentee prefers to sell the product based on his original
patent rather than marketing the improved product. Compulsory
licensing could encourage the patent owner to bring his innovation
to the market in order to avoid forced licensing.
A third potential benefit of compulsory licensing is that it
could reduce wasted energy on "invent around" products. Signifi-
cant amounts of time and effort are expended to create imitation
products by inventing around patents.' Granted, this conduct re-
7. In one study in which a number of German patent owners were interviewed, forty-
three percent stated that they viewed their unutilized inventions as reserve patents (6.7% of
all patents) or blocking patents (3.9% of all patents), whose purpose was to retain exclusive
rights during delayed exploitation or to deny use by competitors. K. GREFERMANN, K. OP-
PENLANDER, E. PEFFGEN, K. ROTHLINGSHOFER & L. SCHOLZ, PATENTWESEN UND
TECHNISCHER FORTSCHRrrT 78 (1974) [hereinafter PATENT AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS].
8. One practitioner, Leroy Whitaker, has asserted, however, that attempts to invent
around patents bring significant advances in technology. Whitaker, Compulsory Licensing -
Another Nail in the Coffin, 2 APLA Q.J. 155, 165-66 (1974). Although Whitaker is correct
that valuable discoveries have been made while trying to imitate patents, compulsory licens-
ing should not prevent such discoveries. Researchers would continue to seek new patentable
discoveries related to prior inventions because of the potential value of an exclusive right over
a new invention. This incentive would include seeking improvement patents for which a
cross license might be obtained. For that matter, competitors might even continue to try to
imitate patented products just to avoid paying royalties under the compulsory license. With a
compulsory licensing scheme, the competitor would have to decide whether the investment to
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suits in price reductions to consumers,9 but it serves no technical
progress. Compulsory licensing could lower prices for consumers
and make duplicative inventions unnecessary.
One final potential benefit of compulsory licensing is that it
could be used as a remedy for patent misuse and antitrust viola-
tions. Compulsory licensing based on anticompetitive use of pat-
ents has been statutorily mandated in a number of countries10 and
judicially endorsed in the United States.11 This remedy can serve as
an alternative to complete patent forfeiture when necessary to re-
store the market to normalcy. 2
II. COMPULSORY LICENSING'S COMPATIBILITY WITH THE
FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSES OF THE PATENT LAWS
A. Is Compulsory Licensing Constitutional?
Regardless of whether compulsory licensing legislation could
provide positive results, such legislation could not be enforced in
the United States unless it could pass constitutional muster. Article
I, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution is the primary source of
Congress' authority to enact laws concerning intellectual property.
That clause, generally known as the Patent and Copyrights Clause,
states that Congress has the power "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."
One author, B.R. Pravel, has asserted that the intended mean-
ing of "exclusive" in clause 8 is that Congress may confer ex-
clusive rights, but not more limited ones. 3 His interpretation
would exclude the granting of a nonexclusive patent such as would
result with compulsory licensing. Although Pravel acknowledges
that the government has the power to take patents under eminent
develop an imitation that does not infringe the patent would be less than the cost of licensing.
If the competitor uses good business judgment, the consumer will benefit from lower prices
and inefficient duplicative research would be reduced as well.
9. F. SCHERER, The Economic Effects of Compulsory Patent Licensing in FINANCE
AND ECONOMICS 13-15 (1977).
10. See, e.g., British Patents Act, 1949, ch. 87, § 37; R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 67(2)(e) (1970).
11. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 82
U.S.P.Q. 111 (1965); Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 64 U.S.P.Q. 18,
clarified in 324 U.S. 570, 65 U.S.P.Q. 1 (1945).
12. Mirabito, Compulsory Patent Licensing for the United States: A Current Proposal,
57 J. PAT. OFF. SoC'Y 404, 405-06 (1975).
13. Pravel, supra note 2, at 191; see also Arnold & Janicke, Compulsory Licensing Any.
one?, 55 J. PAT. OFF. SoC'Y 149, 160 (1973) (noting that clause 8 can be construed to prohibit
Congress from making laws granting nonexclusive rights).
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domain, he stresses that such power is limited to takings for the
"public benefit" and that compulsory licensing results in the confis-
cation of private property only for the benefit of a private citizen,
the licensee.14
The granting of a general compulsory license under a working
requirement would, however, be in the public interest. Such a pro-
vision would ensure that the public receives the benefit of an inno-
vation as soon as possible rather than only after seventeen years.
Moreover, the word "exclusive" in clause 8 should not be inter-
preted as establishing the only type of intellectual property right
that Congress may grant, but instead only as emphasizing the great-
est extent of the rights it may grant.15
Pravel's interpretation is also flawed by his limited view of the
public purpose of the patent grant. He perceives that the public
purpose is satisfied entirely by an inventor's disclosure of his inven-
tion.16 The Supreme Court has interpreted the framers' intent of
the Patent and Copyrights Clause more broadly, however, as au-
thorizing the granting of intellectual property rights when to do so
will establish a "positive effect on society through introduction of
new products into the economy.'"17 More recently, the Court has
stated that "[a]s the text of the Constitution makes plain, it is Con-
gress that has been assigned the task of defining the scope of the
limited monopoly that should be granted to authors or to inventors
in order to give the public appropriate access to their work prod-
uct."18 Thus, the framers' intent has been interpreted not merely to
ensure disclosure of inventions, but also to encourage innovation so
that society can enjoy and benefit from the disclosure of inventions.
This intent includes ensuring that patents are practiced for the pub-
lic benefit. Accordingly, it would appear that it is within Congress'
province to institute measures to ensure that the public receives the
14. Pravel, supra note 2, at 191.
15. See Schecter, Would Compulsory Licensing of Patents be Unconstitutional?, 22 VA.
L. REV. 287, 308-310 (1936).
16. Pravel, supra note 2, at 190.
17. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 64 U.S.P.Q. 18, clarified in 324
U.S. 570, 65 U.S.P.Q. 1 (1945) (emphasis added).
18. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (em-
phasis added). Although this case concerned copyrights, this quote provides insight into the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the framer's intent toward intellectual property rights
under clause 8.
The Supreme Court stated in the Paper Bag Case that patent non-use is permissible
under the current patent laws. Nonetheless, the Court did not say that Congress could not
alter the present law. See Continental Paper Bag Co., v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405
(1908); Schecter, supra note 15, at 292-93; see also infra text accompanying notes 43-45.
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benefits of new inventions soon after disclosure. Congress could do
this through compulsory licensing provisions.
A further indication that the framers did not intend the Pat-
ents and Copyrights Clause to authorize Congress only to grant ex-
clusive rights is evidenced by the concepts of patent property
prevalent at the time the Constitution was written. Under the then-
existing English law, the public's welfare was considered paramount
to that of the patentee.19 Consequently, it is unlikely that the fram-
ers intended to limit Congress' authority to grant unconditional
rights even when to do so would not serve the public interest.
Another indication that a general compulsory licensing statute
would be constitutional is the fact that a number of limited compul-
sory licensing statutes already exist for intellectual property rights
in the United States, and have not been struck down on constitu-
tional grounds. Provisions permitting compulsory licenses have
been included in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,20 the Plant Vari-
ety Protection Act,21 the Clean Air Act of 1970,22 and the Copy-
right Act of 1976.23 All of these acts contain provisions directed at
19. See Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jac. 1, ch. 3 (1624) (providing an exception to an
outright ban on monopolies if the invention was not "contrary to the law or mischievous to
the State by raising prices of commodities at home or hurt trade or... generally inconve-
nient"); Schecter, supra note 15, at 299-301; see also Mirabito, supra note 12, at 407 (stating
that "early common law recognized that the patentee's rights were not absolute but were
permissible for so long as they did not contain certain undesirable aspects").
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2183 (1982). The Secretary of the Department of Energy may declare
any patent "affected with the public interest" if it is of "primary importance in the produc-
tion or utilization of special nuclear material or atomic energy" and its licensing is of "pri-
mary importance to effectuating the policies of the [Act]." Id.; 43 Fed. Reg. 4957 (1979)
(executive order transferring functions from the Atomic Energy Commission to the Secretary
of Energy). This statute has withstood attack on constitutional grounds. Pauling v. McEl-
roy, 164 F. Supp. 390, 393 (D.D.C. 1958), aff'd, 278 F.2d 252 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 835 (1960). But see generally Note, Compulsory Licensing of Patents Under the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, 43 GEO. L.J. 221 (1955) (attacking the constitutionality and efficacy of
the statute).
21. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2402-2404 (1988). This provision authorizes the Secretary of Agricul-
ture to declare a novel variety of an asexually reproduced plant covered by plant variety
protection open to use if he finds that the public must have access to the protected variety in
order to ensure an adequate supply of fiber, food, or feed in the United States. The Secretary
may designate the owner's compensation, presumably on a reasonable royalty basis. Id.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (Supp. IV 1986). This provision permits the EPA Administrator
to recommend to the Attorney General that a compulsory license be granted because a pat-
ented technology concerning the reduction of emissions is not "reasonably available" to pro-
spective licensees. Upon certification by the Attorney General a federal district court can
compel the patentee to license the technology on terms that the court finds reasonable. Id.
See generally Gerber & Kitson, Compulsory Licensing of Patents Under the Clean Air Act of
1970, 54 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 650 (1972).
23. 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 115, 116, 118 (1988). These provisions permit the granting of
compulsory licenses on the following copyrighted materials: cable television, phonorecords,
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specific intellectual property subject matter and permit the granting
of involuntary licenses to private individuals.2 4 None of these laws
has been successfully challenged on a constitutional basis.
B. Congress' Intent as to the Patent System
Although the Patents and Copyrights Clause of the Constitu-
tion appears to grant authority to enact general compulsory licens-
ing provisions, Congress need not, and apparently has not, expressly
endorsed such a law. Nevertheless, compulsory licensing does not
appear to be at odds with the general purposes for which Congress
has established the patent laws. This is evidenced by judicial impo-
sition of limited compulsory licensing schemes as consistent with
congressional intent.
1. Compulsory Licensing as an Antitrust/Misuse
Remedy
The first and most common type of limited compulsory
licenses adopted by the courts are those ordered as a remedy for
patent misuse or antitrust violations.2" Both reasonable royalty and
royalty-free compulsory licenses have been ordered.26 Both types of
remedies have withstood constitutional challenge.27
jukeboxes, and noncommercial broadcasting. This statute's constitutionality was acknowl-
edged in M.B. Schnapper Public Affairs Press v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 115 n.6, 212 U.S.P.Q.
235 (D.C. Cir. 1981). But see generally Schaffer, Are the Compulsory License Provisions of the
Copyright Law Unconstitutional?, 2 COMM. & L. I (Winter 1980) (challenging the constitu-
tionality of compulsory licensing provisions in the Copyright Act).
24. A number of other compulsory licensing statutes in the United States permit the
government to have an involuntary license. See, eg., Coal Research and Development Act,
30 U.S.C. § 666 (1982); Helium Act, 50 U.S.C. § 16T (1982); Tennessee Valley Act, 16
U.S.C. § 831r (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1982). These provisions have characteristics of emi-
nent domain, and therefore even opponents of general compulsory licensing consider them
constitutional. See Pravel, supra note 2, at 199-201.
25. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text. Even as of 1959 it was estimated that
between 40,000 and 50,000 patents had been affected by antitrust/misuse compulsory licens-
ing judgments. STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENT, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF
THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON COMPULSORY
PATENT LICENSING UNDER ANTITRUST JUDGMENTS 5 (Comm. Print 1960). However,
even when judgments call for compulsory licenses, often no license is ever instituted. See W.
BOWMAN, JR., PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW 246 (1973). Moreover the ability to utilize
the patent misuse doctrine has recently been significantly curtailed by new legislation, and
consequently, the number of compulsory license judgments may decrease. See 35 U.S.C.A.
271(d) (West Supp. 1988); see also SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, The Intell. Prop. Antitrust
Protection Act, 1988, S. REP. No. 492, 100th Cong., 2d Sss. (1988) [hereinafter S. REP. No.
492].
26. See, e.g., United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947); United States v.
General Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. 835 (D.N.J. 1953).
27. National Lead, 332 U.S. at 328-35; General Electric, 125 F. Supp. at 844.
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When antitrust violations have been found, the courts have
generally ruled that the patentee's exclusive right cannot prevail:
When the patent holder so far overreaches his privilege as to
intrude upon the rights of... the public ... and does this in such
a way that he cannot further exercise the privilege without also
trespassing upon the rights thus protected, either his right or the
other person's and the public right, must give way. It is wholly
incongruous in such circumstances to say that the privilege of the
trespasser shall be preserved and the rights of all others which he
has transgressed shall continue to give way to the consequences
of his wrongdoing.2 8
In these circumstances the antitrust laws are deemed para-
mount to the exclusive rights granted under the patent laws. The
objective here is compatible with the primary objectives of the pat-
ent laws; in these cases the antitrust laws encourage innovation by
eliminating barriers to free competition.
29
2. Compulsory Licensing in the Public Interest
A second type of judicially endorsed compulsory licensing oc-
curs when courts refuse to grant injunctions based on findings that
to do so would be injurious to the public interest.30 In these cases, a
governmental entity is normally infringing the plaintiff's patent and
cites as its defense the public's health and safety. Aside from any
governmental tort immunity,31 these governmental bodies argue
28. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 453, 64 U.S.P.Q. 18 (Rutledge,
J., dissenting in part), claified in 324 U.S. 570, 65 U.S.P.Q. 1 (1945).
29. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, RESTRIC-
TIVE BUSINESS PRACTICE RELATING TO PATENTS AND LICENSEES 6 (1973); see also S. REP.
No. 492, supra note 25, at 2 (stating that "[i]n preventing monopolists from illegally dominat-
ing or blocking access to markets, the antitrust law also encourages innovation").
30. E.g., City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577, 579, 21 U.S.P.Q. 69
(7th Cir. 1934) (finding that the public safety would be jeopardized without the use of the
plaintiff's patent for irradiating water); Bliss v. City of Brooklyn, 3 F. Cas. 706, 706-07
(C.C.N.Y. 1871) (No. 1,544) (reasoning that the citizens' safety was at stake without the use
of plaintiff's patented fire hose coupling).
Additionally, Vitamin Technologists v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Found., 146 F.2d
941 (9th Cir. 1945), is often cited as a "public interest" compulsory licensing case. In Vita-
min Technologists, the plaintiff had refused to license a process for making Vitamin D so that
the defendant could use it in making oleomargarine. The defendant infringed and was subse-
quently sued. At trial, evidence was offered to show that margarine with Vitamin D had
health benefits and that the plaintiff had not licensed or used his patent for margarine. The
Ninth Circuit declared the patent unenforceable in the public interest. However, the patent
was held invalid on other grounds, and consequently the court's statements as to public inter-
est are dicta. See id. at 945.- More interestingly, the court was willing to make the public
interest conclusion even though the defendant was not a governmental body.
31. See Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10 (1896) (denying both an injunction and damages
based on sovereign immunity). But see Hercules, Inc. v. Minnesota State Highway Dep't, 337
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that infringing for such purposes is acting under its police power for
the benefit of its citizens.32 They have also been successful iri argu-
ing that because under the patent statute a court "may" grant an
injunction consistent "with the principles of equity," a court can
decide not to grant an injunction against a governmental entity
infringer.33
In denying injunctions against local governmental bodies in
such cases, courts have ordered royalties be paid to infringed paten-
tees.3" In this way, the "taking" is justly compensated. Moreover,
by permitting public access to inventions crucial to the public
health and safety, this relief is compatible with the patent statute's.
emphasis on the public's benefit.
3. Compulsory Licensing Because of Patent Non-Use
The third type of judicially approved compulsory licensing oc-
curs when a patentee has not practiced his invention.3 The analy-
sis underlying this case law would appear to rationalize a general
compulsory licensing scheme under which any patent, no matter
what subject matter, could be subjected to licensing because of non-
use.
In Foster v. American Machine & Foundry Co.,36 the Second
Circuit upheld the granting of a compulsory license to a private
manufacturer because the plaintiff patentee had not worked his pat-
ent.37 A subsidiary of American Machine, Thermotool Inc., manu-
factured welding machinery that included a component which
embodied the process protected by Foster's patent. The component
covered by the patent was necessary for the machinery to operate,
and Foster had not made a product covered by his patent or li-
censed his patent. The Second Circuit stated:
F. Supp. 795 (D. Minn. 1972) (denying damages based on immunity but holding an injunc-
tion was proper).
32. A similar argument can be made under the eminent domain statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498 (1982). Under section 1498, any patent may be used "by or for the United States."
This statute is consistent with the fifth amendment because it allows a "taking" for the "pub-
lic use." It is also consistent with that amendment because it provides for "just
compensation."
33. See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1982).
34. See, eg., City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d at 579, 21 U.S.P.Q.
at 71; Bliss v. City, of Brooklyn, 3 F. Cas. at 706-07.
35. Foster v. American Mach. & Foundry Co., 492 F.2d 1317, 182 U.S.P.Q. I (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 833 (1974); see also American Photocopy Equip. Co. v. Rovivo, Inc.,
359 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1966).
36. 492 F.2d 1317, 182 U.S.P.Q. 1 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 833 (1974).
37. 492 F.2d at 1319.
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An injunction to protect a patent against infringement, like any
otlher injunction, is an equitable remedy to be determined by the
circumstances. It is not intended as a club to be wielded by a
patentee to enhance his negotiating stance.... In the assessment
of relative equities, the [lower] court could properly conclude
that to impose irreparable hardship on the infringer by injunc-
tion, without any concomitant benefit to the patentee, would be
inequitable.
Instead, the District Court avoided ordering a cessation of busi-
ness to the benefit of neither party by compensating appellant in
the form of a compulsory license with royalties .... Here the
compulsory license is a benefit to the patentee who has been un-
able to pre~ail in his quest for injunctive relief. To grant him a
compulsory royalty is to give him half a loaf. In the circum-
stances of his utter failure to exploit the patent on his own, that
seems fair.38
This last type of judicially endorsed compulsory license ap-
pears to be an anomaly. Foster cites federal court precedent, 39 but
none of the cases cited involved non-working by the patentee.40
Moreover, Foster ignores the Supreme Court's holding in the Paper
Bag Case41 that the patent laws permit non-use.4 2
In the Paper Bag Case, the Eastern Paper Bag Company was
the owner of a patent for a bag making machine it did not commer-
cially use. The district court found that the defendant infringed the
patent and issued a permanent injunction. On appeal, the defend-
ant argued that a court of equity had no jurisdiction to restrain the
infringement of a patent that was being suppressed. The Supreme
Court stated, "We dissent entirely from the thought thus urged,"
and held that the right of a patentee not to use his invention is
within the exclusive right granted under the patent laws.43 The
Court noted that Congress had likewise consistently refused to en-
act a general compulsory licensing statute.44
The Supreme Court did, however, leave open the possibility
that there might be a situation in which non-use of a patent would
38. Id. at 1324, 182 U.S.P.Q. at 6 (citations omitted).
39. See citations accompanying the opinion in Foster, 492 F.2d at 1324, 182 U.S.P.Q. at
6.
40. For an in-depth review of each of the cases cited as precedent in Foster, see Morton,
Compulsory Licensing: An Unplanned-for Addition to the United StatesPatent System, 2
APLA Q.L 171, 176-182 (1974); Pravel, supra note 2, at 196.
41. Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908).
42. Id. at 423-24.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 429. The Court opined that Congress could not have been ignorant of the fact
that many foreign countries have provisions for compulsory licenses when a patentee has
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prevent issuance of an injunction against an infringer. Emphasizing
that it was not deciding the issue, the Court noted that the "public
interest" might create a justification for a court of equity to with-
hold relief to a patentee.45
Although it could be argued that Foster fits within the Supreme
Court's dicta in the Paper Bag Case, the facts of Foster are indistin-
guishable in any material respect from those in the Paper Bag Case.
Any argument that Foster's invention was vital to the welding in-
dustry would not likely satisfy the Supreme Court's public interest
requirement, just as the Supreme Court was not moved by the de-
fendant's claim that the public would be deprived of a new paper
bag making machine unless a compulsory license was ordered. In-
stead, the Court is likely to have intended, by its reference to the
"public interest," that the need for the practice of a patent would
have to rise to a high level of concern for the public's health and
safety. Despite the weak support behind the decision, the Supreme
Court denied certiorari in Foster.46 The case may serve as prece-
dent for judicially ordered compulsory licensing when a patentee
has failed to work his patent.
The weight that Foster carries today, however, appears to be
quite minimal. Congress has repeatedly refused to enact a working
requirement47 and very recently it enacted legislation that appears
to overrule Foster.48 In 1988, Congress amended section 271(d) of
title 35 in an effort to minimize the scope of the patent misuse doc-
trine. That section now states, inter alia, that "[n]o patent owner
... shall be denied relief... [for having] refused to license or use
any rights to [his] patent."'49
Unfortunately, the legislative history of the amendment reveals
failed to practice his invention. The Court, therefore, concluded that Congress has con-
sciously refused to enact such legislation. Id.
It should be noted that Congress established a working requirement for alien patentees
in 1832. That act required aliens "to introduce into public use in the United States the inven-
tion or improvement" within one year of patent issuance or forfeit their patent. Act of July
13, 1832, ch. 203, 4 Stat. 577. Congress repealed this act, however, expressly denouncing a
working requirement. See Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 21, 5 Stats. 117, 125.
45. The Paper Bag Case, 210 U.S. 405 at 430; see also Special Equip. v. Coe, 324 U.S.
370, 383, 64 U.S.P.Q. 525 (1945) (questioning, "How may the words 'to make, use, and vend'
be read to mean 'not to make, not to use, and not to vend?' ").
46. 419 U.S. 833 (1974).
47. See Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 433 & nn. 26, 27, 64
U.S.P.Q. 18, clarified in 324 U.S. 570, 65 U.S.P.Q. 1 (1945), for a list of bills presented
between 1897 and 1943 proposing a working requirement. For the most recently rejected
proposal, see S. 814, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1975), CONG. REC. S2453 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1975).
48. 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(d)(4) (West Supp. 1988).
49. Id.
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a dearth of information on this particular provision. Congress ap-
pears to have been more concerned with the judicial presumption of
market power being attached to patent owners using tying arrange-
ments with patent licenses.5 0 The only statement about the non-
use/no license provision was that it was a codification of the "cur-
rent caselaw [sic] and makes sense as a matter of policy."51
Although a patentee's intentional non-use of a patent might have
been challenged as patent misuse, no American court, not even Fos-
ter, has ever upheld such an assertion. Consequently, this provision
appears to have slipped into the amendment without extensive
discussion. 2
In amending section 271(d), Congress seems to have over-
looked the fact that the promotion of the sciences and arts is not
advanced by allowing a patentee to suppress intellectual property
for the preservation of an old inferior market. In such a manner,
the patentee is not deriving his profit from promotion of a market,
but from manipulation of the market.5 3 It is not part of the consti-
tutional scheme, and it was not part of the patent law scheme before
the amendment to section 271, that inventors should be able to
profit from suppression of their creations. It therefore follows that
the institution of compulsory licensing to combat non-use is com-
patible with the fundamental purposes of the patent system and that
Congress could enact such legislation if it so desired.
III. THE EFFICACY OF A GENERAL COMPULSORY LICENSING
STATUTE
Although a number of benefits can be cited as likely to result
from general compulsory licensing and that such legislation would
be constitutionally permissible,54 there is little evidence that any
substantial outcome would occur from such a law. Moreover,
although general compulsory licensing is theoretically consistent
with the fundamental purpose of the patent laws, to encourage in-
50. See S. REP. No. 492, supra note 25; CONG. REC. H10646 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1988);
CONG. REC. S17146 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988).
51. CONG. RECS. H10646, H10648 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1988) (statement by Representa-
tive Kastenmeier) (citing the Paper Bag Case, 210 U.S. 405 and SCM v. Xerox Corp., 209
U.S.P.Q. 889, 899 (2d Cir. 1981)).
52. The unobtrusiveness with which this provision became part of the amendment is
further evidenced by its legislative history's silence in comparison to the previous vocal legis-
lative attempts at similar laws. See supra note 47.
53. See Blout Mfg. Co. v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 166 F. Supp. 555, 561 (D. Mass.
1909).
54. See supra sections I and II A.
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novation for society's benefit, its implementation could actually
frustrate that very purpose.
A. Potential Problems with General Compulsory Licensing
As Justice Fortas stated, "those who believe they are attacking
the abuses of the [patent] system may inadvertently damage the sys-
tem itself.""5
Similarly, opponents of compulsory licensing argue that such
licensing provisions would destroy the research incentive that is so
integral to the patent system. 6 This position would appear to be
most valid if the royalties granted under a compulsory licensing sys-
tem were not comparable to those that would be obtained under
voluntary licensing. If, through compulsory licensing, an investor
or inventor is not going to recoup his investment or is going to re-
ceive less profit, he would have less incentive to devote time and
money to creating new innovations than he would if he could antici-
pate an unconditional exclusive right.
This risk appears quite real as the experience of courts here
and abroad demonstrate. The U.S. courts have struggled to deter-
mine reasonable royalties in patent infringement suits, 57 and under
foreign compulsory licensing schemes inadequate royalties have
been granted." In particular, when a license is granted because of
non-use, there is no voluntary license royalty to look to for gui-
dance. Moreover, substantial debate exists as to whether the invest-
ment in unsuccessful research, in addition to the cost of research
that actually resulted in discovering the invention which is the sub-
ject of the patent being licensed, should be included in the royalty
assessment. 9 On one hand, why should the licensee pay for the
55. Fortas, The Patent System in Distress, 53 J. PAT OFF. Soc'Y 810, 820 (1971).
56. Whitaker, supra note 8, at 158-59, 163-65; Sease, Common Sense, Nonsense and the
Compulsory License, 55 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 233, 251 (1973); Arnold & Janicke, supra note 13,
at 161-62.
57. See, e.g., Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116,
116 U.S.P.Q. 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified sub nom., Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Ply-
wood-Champion Papers, Inc., 446 F.2d 295, 170 U.S.P.Q. 369 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 870 (1971).
58. See F. SCHERER, supra note 9, at 44-45 (noting that the $336/kg compulsory license
royalty granted in Britain in Hoffmann LaRoche & Co. A.G.'s Patent, 1969 R.P.D. & T.M.
504, was substantially less than the monopoly royalty estimate of $800 to $1,100). See gener-
ally Henry, Multi-National Practice in Determining Provisions in Compulsory Patent Licenses,
1977 J. INT'L & ECON. 325, 329-37, 33843 (describing the process of royalty determination
under a number of foreign licensing statutes).
59. British courts consider unsuccessful research investment when assessing royalties
for compulsory licenses. See J.R. Geigy S.A.'s Patent, 1964 R.P.D. & T.M. 391, 398-400.
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patentee's failures? On the other hand, failures are a cost of doing
business when research and development is the business.
In addition to the risk of inhibiting the research incentive, gen-
eral compulsory licensing is also problematic because of the added
pressure on the patentee to quickly market a new invention. If the
patentee does not immediately market his invention, under a com-
pulsory licensing scheme, he must risk having an incipient or actual
infringer compel voluntary licensing regardless of his good faith ef-
fort to practice his invention. 60 Such duress may result in license
royalties that do not fully recoup research and development costs,
and as a consequence may deter future investment. Furthermore,
such a statute would likely foster litigation for those patentees who
resist licensing. 61
B. How Great a Need is There?
Although several opponents of compulsory licensing assert
that there is no patent suppression,62 there is evidence that it does
exist.63 What suppression there is appears quite minimal, however.
Consequently, there is a significant question as to whether there is
any great need for general compulsory licensing.
The specialized compulsory licensing statutes that currently
exist in the United States have rarely been utilized which may indi-
cate that even those in the marketplace do not feel a need to obtain
compulsory licenses. Since the enactment of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, only one compulsory license has been issued.r' That
license was issued only after a dispute between the patentee and the
On the other hand, Canada does not. See Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Frank W. Homer Ltd.,
64 C.P.R. 93, 106 (1970).
60. Grace periods may partially reduce this problem. However, strict time limits would
likely present problems to some inventors.
61. See Pravel, supra note 2, at 208.
62. See Whitaker, supra note 8, at 155-57; Sease, supra note 56, at 252.
63. See Continental Paper Bag Co., v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908);
Foster v. American Mach. & Foundry Co., 492 F.2d 1317, 182 U.S.P.Q. 1 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 827 (1974); PATENT AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS, supra note 7 and accom-
panying text.
64. Mirabito, supra note 12, at 418. Two other applications have been filed, one in 1969
and the other in 1975. Neither resulted in a license. Telephone interview with Judson High-
tower, Deputy Assistant, General Counsel for Procurement Policy, Dep't of Energy (Dec. 12,
1989); see also In re Picker Co., Application for Patent License Under U.S. Patent No.
3,011,057 (Energy Research and Development Admin. & Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n Aug.
27, 1969); In re Hewlett-Packard Co., Application for Patent License Under U.S. Patent No.
3,601,609 (Energy Research & Development Admin. & Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n July 30,
1975).
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licensee/applicant arose as to the appropriate royalty.65 The license
did not, therefore, result from patent suppression.
No licenses have been issued under the Plant Variety Protec-
tion Act. 66 However, this provision was only intended for use dur-
ing a major disaster, e.g., a corn blight affecting all types of corn
except a patented variety that the patentee is unwilling to license.
Consequently, because this licensing provision was 'contemplated
only for a national emergency, and no such emergency has occurred
since the law was enacted, licensing under it may not be representa-
tive of what might occur under a general licensing law.67
Under the compulsory licensing provision of the Clean Air Act
of 1970,68 no applications have been filed or licenses granted. 69 Ap-
parently this provision was enacted as part of the 1970s' fervent
drive for increased government regulation, particularly in the area
of environmental protection. Substantiated suppression does not
appear to have been a motivating factor for its enactment.
Numerous compulsory licenses have been granted under the
Copyright Act of 1976, but the situation surrounding these provi-
sions is unique. These provisions have been established to protect
the copyright owners in enforcing their rights rather than to aid in
ensuring that the public receives the benefit of intellectual prop-
erty.70 For example, a standard compulsory license is granted to
jukebox owners because it is difficult for the owner of the copyright
on the songs played on the jukebox to know how often they were
heard.7' Because copyright protection presents unique problems
that are not found in patent law, the prominent use of compulsory
licenses for copyright material is not indicative of the need for such
licensing under the patent laws.
Further evidence that general compulsory licensing provisions
may not be needed in the United States is the frequency of use of
such provisions in foreign countries possessing these laws. Under
65. Mirabito, supra note 12, at 418.
66. Id at 418-19.
67. See id. at 419.
68. See supra note 22.
69. Telephone interview with Richard Wilson, Director of Mobil Sources Div., Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (Dec. 12, 1989); telephone interview with John Rasnik, Deputy
Director of Stationary Sources Div., Environmental Protection Agency (Dec. 11, 1989); see
also Mirabito, supra note 12, at 418.
70. See R. BROWN & R. DENICOLA, COPYRIGHT: UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND
OTHER Topics BEARING ON THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY, MUSICAL, AND ARTISTIC
WORKS 407-25 (4th ed. 1985).
71. Cf H. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 112, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE &
CONG. ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5727.
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the British general compulsory licensing statute,72 only two licenses
were granted out of sixteen applications filed.73 Under Canada's
general compulsory licensing provision,74 only eleven licenses were
granted between 1935 and 1970.71 These numbers appear minimal
compared to the number of voluntary licenses that were most likely
granted.76
The need for a general compulsory licensing statute is ques-
tionable because of the alternative mechanisms that already exist for
those situations in which compulsory licensing might be needed.
First, courts can apply "principles of equity" under section 283 of
the Patent Act when the public needs the use of an invention for its
health and safety.7 7 Second, if a situation arises in which the public
welfare requires that private parties have the ability to practice an
invention, Congress can draft emergency legislation. 78 Further-
more, antitrust laws already exist to combat the misuse of patents
for anticompetitive behavior, and therefore a general compulsory
licensing law imposing involuntary licenses in such situations would
be duplicative.
IV. CONCLUSION
A general compulsory licensing law designed to ensure that the
public receives the benefit of innovation as soon as possible would
be constitutional and consistent with the fundamental purposes of
the patent system. However, the need for such a law is questiona-
ble. Such a law could have a negative effect on the research incen-
tive provided by the United States patent system. Moreover, for the
situations in which the public health is at risk or the abuse or the
misuse of patents is great, there are already statutory and judicial
mechanisms to resolve such problems. Accordingly, the economic
72. British Patents Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, ch. 87, § 37.
73. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, RESTRic-
TIVE BUSINESS PRACTICE RELATING TO PATENTS AND LICENSEES 27 (1973).
74. R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 67 (1970).
75. ECONOMIC COUNCIL OF CANADA, REPORT OF INTELLECTUAL AND INDUSTRIAL
PROPERTY 68 (1971) (reporting 53 applications filed).
76. But see Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 146 (suggesting that the small number of com-
pulsory licensing grants is not a sign of significance, but rather an indication that meaningful
voluntary license negotiations have been stimulated).
77. Courts can act much as the Activated Sludge and Bliss courts did. See supra notes
30-34 and accompanying text.
78. For those who do not believe that the normal economic incentives to license are
sufficient, they can be reassured that Congress is unlikely to stand idly by should, for exam-
ple, a patentee of the cure for cancer refuse to license and not meet the demand. Also, in
such a circumstance, the government itself could get into manufacturing and use 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498 to appropriate the patent.
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incentive to voluntarily license appears sufficient to avoid patent
non-use for the most part, and the institution of a general compul-
sory licensing statute in the United States would not be worth the
risk to the system as it now stands.

